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INTRODUCTION
Thank you so much, Dean Perdue, and for all the students who have
worked so hard to pull this event together. And thank you, Dean Perdue,
for that introduction. Dean Perdue knew me for over 18 years while I was
teaching at Georgetown Law School and I am so glad she didn't tell any
embarrassing stories about me -- because, I assure you, she could have.
You have heard a lot this morning about the need in 1964 for Congress to
enact prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of race, national
origin and religion. I am going to use my time, therefore, to talk about gen-
der equity: the addition of the sex discrimination prohibition in Title VII,
the advances that have occurred since passage of that law, and the miles that
we still have to go to achieve full gender equity.
The first panel we heard this morning set up marvelously the framework
I want to use for my remarks. Under this framework, achievement of any
social justice goal requires three variables operating in concert - law, poli-
cies in practice and social norms.
By "law," I mean words. Lots of words. This includes the words of a
statute that has been passed by a legislature, either Congress or a state or a
local legislature. It includes the words of regulations and guidances that are
issued by agencies that are charged with implementing the law, like the
EEOC was charged with implementing the employment provisions of the
Civil Rights Act. And it includes the words of court cases in which courts
are interpreting specific provisions of a law. All of these words make up
"the law."
By "policies in practice," I mean whether the words in the statutes, regu-
lations, guidances, and court decisions are reflected in the daily policies and
practices of organizations that are governed by the law. Has the social goal
the law is seeking to achieve actually been absorbed into the sinews of
those organizations? For example, is a law which states, "you may not dis-
criminate based on certain characteristics in employment decisions" - is
that prohibition actually reflected in the daily policies of employers? Or is
the prohibition simply just words?
By "social norms," I mean what ordinary people believe should be the
right rules to govern society. A government can have lots of laws, and or-
ganizations can have lots concrete policies implementing those laws, and it
will still not be enough until people across society, in their hearts and
minds, believe the social justice goal that is trying to be achieved by those
laws and policies is a good thing -- there will never be a full achievement of
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that goal. There will be always be ways for people to stop change that they
don't believe in.
There is an interesting synergism and dynamic between these three vari-
ables. They are not static or linear. A society often has to start off with en-
acting a law to require a certain social goal because many people will not
conform their actions to that goal unless they are legally required to do so.
But social norms with regard to that goal have to be sufficiently evolved
such that - in our democratic system -- enough people believe the govern-
ment should enact that goal. If a law is passed and effectively enforced,
then organizations governed by the law will begin to put into place policies
to comply with the law. This will begin to transform the words of the law
into actual change on the ground. As people then begin to conform their
actions to these required policies that may help them accept the appropri-
ateness of the social goal. After complying with employment non-
discrimination requirements, it may not seem unimaginable to an individual
to work alongside a person of color or a woman. And as the social goal be-
comes more accepted and "normal," that further helps organizations to
comply with the law (because the legal requirement does not seem as for-
eign) and it helps people comply with the required policy (because they
agree with the policy now). So there is a synergistic, dialectical effect con-
stantly in play among these three variables.
THE SEX DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITION IN TITLE VII OF THE CIVWL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964 - SOME HISTORY
Let's use this framework to discuss the evolution of the sex discrimina-
tion prohibition of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII pro-
hibits private employers and unions from discriminating on the basis of
race, color, national origin, religion and sex. As you heard this morning,
when Title VII was first introduced, it did not include sex. In fact, as many
people noted this morning, one of the reasons why many members of the
House of Representatives voted to add sex to the list of prohibited catego-
ries of discrimination was to make it a "poison pill" for the bill because
they didn't want the bill to pass.
When people tell this story, they often add the assertion that Congress
never even thought about the issue of sex discrimination before it added the
sex discrimination prohibition to Title VII as a poison pill. That is not a
completely accurate rendition of the story. Indeed, for those of you work-
ing at the law review that will publish papers from this symposium, here is
an interesting fact. I think Prof. Cary Franklin tracked down what was one
of the first times (if not the first time) this mythical story was set forth in a
20151
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document following passage of Title VII. It was one paragraph written by
law students at the Harvard Law Review, in the early seventies, with just
one citation. (The citation was to a statement by Representative Edith
Green on the House floor, the one woman Member of Congress who op-
posed adding the sex discrimination provision because she was afraid that it
would bring down the whole bill.) Relying on Representative Green's
statement, the paragraph stated - in a conclusory fashion - that Congress
had never thought about the issue of sex discrimination prior to passage of
the Civil Rights Act, that the sudden addition of sex on the House floor was
designed simply to kill the bill, and that the implications of the sex discrim-
ination provision had therefore never been understood or thought-through
by Congress.
This simplistic view of how sex got added to Title VII was picked up and
used repeatedly by the courts - particularly whenever a court was restricted
the scope of the sex discrimination and justified that restriction on the
grounds that Congress could never have imagined the broader scope of the
provision being argued for in the case before it.
So the lesson of this story is that Law Review articles sometimes do mat-
ter - at least in creating false information.
The more complete story about the addition of sex to Title VII is as fol-
lows. Congress had, in fact, been debating and grappling with the issue of
sex discrimination for forty years prior to passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. But that Congressional debate was not in the context of an employ-
ment non-discrimination law applying to private employers and to unions.
Rather, it was in the context of the Equal Rights Amendment (the "ERA")
to the federal Constitution.
The National Women's Party, the key advocate for the ERA, had been
fighting since the 1920's for Congress to add an equal rights amendment to
the federal Constitution. In the 1940s and early 1950s, there had been a fair
amount of activity around the ERA. At that time, the ERA said: "Equality
of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any state on account of sex." If that amendment had passed and been
ratified by the states, no federal or state law could have been enacted that
denied or abridged rights on account of sex.
As you know, Congress did not pass the ERA in the 1940s or 1950s.
Congress did ultimately pass the ERA many years later and sent it to the
states for ratification. And as you all know, ultimately, the states did not
ratify the ERA.
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The reason the ERA did not pass Congress in the 1940s or 1950s, despite
extensive debate in Congress, was that, in 1950, the unions and various
women's groups other than the National Women's Party, prevailed on Con-
gress to add a second sentence to the ERA. That sentence read as follows:
"The provisions of this article shall not be construed to impair any rights,
benefits, or exemptions conferred by law upon persons of the female sex."
So the first sentence of the ERA said, "No law may take sex into account,"
and the second sentence said, "Yes, laws may take sex into account if they
confer rights, benefits, or exemptions just on women."
What was going on here? It was a combination of practical politics and
social norms.
As a matter of social norms, in 1950, the assumption was that women
were really different from men. Their true jobs were to be wives and moth-
ers. Some women might have to go into the workforce because of financial
necessity, but that was not their true job.
As a matter of practical politics, the unions and women's groups had
successfully gotten labor laws enacted in various states, and upheld against
federal constitutional challenges, by having those laws protect only women
-- on the grounds that women were inherently different than men. They
managed to get laws that put a limit on the maximum amount of hours that
women could work in a job or that prohibited women from working in jobs
considered too hazardous -- on the grounds that women were inherently dif-
ferent than men. Women were wives and mothers first, so they needed laws
that enabled them to do their real jobs.
For that reason, the unions and women's groups were wary of a blanket
ERA that would not allow any law to "take sex into account." And the
members of the National Women's Party did not want an ERA with the
second sentence because they felt that undermined their entire goal of com-
plete equality for women. So there was an impasse on the ERA.
Now, thirteen years later, in 1963, Title VII is introduced prohibiting dis-
crimination in employment, but not including sex as a prohibited character-
istic for making employment decisions. The National Women's Party sees
this as a perfect opportunity to have, at least, some provision in law prohib-
iting sex discrimination. A number of the leaders of the National Women's
Party were not supportive of the bill itself. They were fine about placing a
prohibition against taking sex into account in laws that were enacted on
states or the federal government. But many of them did not support a law
that would prohibit private employers from discriminating on the basis of
race. But they figured, as a practical matter, that if such a law was going to
be enacted anyway, at a minimum they wanted sex to be included as well.
20151
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So members of the National Women's Party asked conservative Con-
gressman Howard Smith to introduce an amendment to Title VII, on the
House floor, that would add sex as a prohibited ground for discrimination.
As has been correctly noted, Congressman Smith was a staunch opponent
of the Civil Rights Act and he voted against the final bill in the House. But
what is often not understood is that Congressman Smith was also one of the
chief supporters of the ERA. Indeed, he had been the Congressman who
had introduced the ERA in every Congress for a number of years. So he
himself, like the National Women's Party members, was a strong supporter
of the ERA, although not of the Civil Rights Act.
There were twelve women members of the House at that point. Can you
imagine -just twelve. Eleven out of those twelve members supported add-
ing sex to Title VII. They also supported having Congressman Smith intro-
duce the amendment because, as a matter of practical politics, they hoped
he would help get the amendment passed. They assumed some number of
people would vote for the amendment as a poison pill, that others would
vote for it because they thought it was unlikely to pass anyway, and finally,
there would be people like themselves who would vote for it because they
thought it was the right thing to do. And indeed, the combination of those
groups became the majority that was mustered to pass the amendment in the
House, much to the surprise and chagrin of the leaders of the bill (including
Representative Edith Green, the only woman Member of the House who
voted against the amendment).
There is a very interesting part of this story about how sex managed to
stay in Title VII in the bill that was ultimately passed by the Senate. Much
of the credit for that belongs to a lawyer named Pauli Murray, an African
American lawyer, who was part of the group working for passage of the
Civil Rights Act. In the 1940s, Murray was part of a small cadre of people
who engaged in the direct action of sitting in segregated restaurants and
buses. The actions of that small group of people did not have the same im-
pact as similar actions did a decade later, because, as you heard this morn-
ing, one needed the massive direct action that ultimately came into play
during that later time. In any event, Pauli Murray played an incredible role
in the development of civil rights in this country. I urge you to read her au-
tobiography: The Autobiography of a Black Activist, Feminist, Lawyer,
Priest and Poet. I am on a personal mission to get Murray's autobiography
available on Kindle. So if you do go to Amazon to buy her book in print,
please also click on "I would like to see this on Kindle." Maybe that will
help get her amazing story out in the public more. If you read that book,
you will get a sense of some of the work it took to retain the sex discrimina-
tion provision in Title VII as the bill moved through the Senate.
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But here is the interesting fact. The words - "no sex discrimination in
employment" -- became part of Title VII. But because social norms were
not yet at a place where men and women were actually perceived to be the
same for purposes of employment, the EEOC, the agency created to imple-
ment Title VII, and subsequently the courts, found it hard to accept the
words of the law at face value. They found it hard to imagine and accept
that the law's prohibition on sex discrimination was just like the law's pro-
hibition on discrimination based on race, national origin, and religion.
Here is an example that encapsulates this resistance and lack of under-
standing. In July 1965, about a year after the Civil Rights Act was passed,
the EEOC opened its doors for business. The Commission quickly ruled
that it was illegal to have "help wanted" ads in newspapers that said: "For
Negroes" or "for Whites." There used to be these things called newspapers,
they had help wanted ads, and people read them. The EEOC ruled that
those ads discriminated on the basis of race and therefore violated Title VII.
But newspapers also ran "help wanted" ads that said "Men wanted" or
"Women wanted." The EEOC ruled, in September 1965, that this practice
did not violate the sex discrimination prohibition of Title VII. The Com-
mission's reasoning was that because the personal inclinations of women
and men were such that many job categories were of interest only to women
or only to men, segregating these ads by sex was not discrimination. Ra-
ther, these ads were simply helping applicants find the jobs they wanted an-
yway. Of course, if a woman applied for a job in the "men wanted" col-
umn, or if a man applied for a job in the "women wanted" column, Title VII
prohibited an employer from not hiring the person based on sex. But the
ads themselves were fine.
This decision by the EEOC so outraged women's rights advocates that it
became the catalyst for the founding of the National Organization of Wom-
en. If you go onto NOW's website and look under the "history" tab, you
will see that it describes the EEOC's decision to allow sex-segregated ads
as one of the reasons NOW was created. That was because women's advo-
cates were told (by a few feminists inside the EEOC) that women's advo-
cates needed an organization like the NAACP in order to pressure the
EEOC to do the right thing in implementing the law. And, in fact, one of
the first victories that NOW won was to get the EEOC to change its posi-
tion and rule that sex-segregated ads violated Title VII.
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THE SEX DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITION IN TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964 - THE EARLY DECADES
After its inauspicious start, the EEOC emerged as a leader in shaping the
law of sex discrimination. The EEOC had various mechanisms in which it
was able to do so. First, when the EEOC found there was reasonable cause
to believe that discrimination had occurred in the context of a charge that
had been brought by an individual against a private employer or a union,
the Commission often issued a Commission decision explaining its legal
reasoning for "finding cause." Second, after a few years, the Commission
began to issue guidelines to implement Title VII, which brought together
many of the legal conclusions the Commission had put forward in its deci-
sions. Finally, once the EEOC was permitted to bring litigation against
employers and unions (which happened through amendments to Title VII
that Congress passed in 1972), the EEOC also set forth its view of the law
through cases that it brought.
Through these different mechanisms, the EEOC set forth various propo-
sitions that explained its view of sex discrimination. For example, the
EEOC issued such radical statements as: If an employer hires married men,
it may not refuse to hire married women. And: If an employer hires a man
who has young children, the employer may not refuse to hire a woman who
has young children.
Those really were radical propositions at the time. That is because the
social norms at the time were such that those were natural things that many
employers did and were expected to do. So it was hard for many employers
- and often courts -- to believe that the law would prohibit these practices.
The Commission also concluded that if an employer fired a woman be-
cause she was pregnant, that was a form of sex discrimination. And it con-
cluded that if a woman needed time off after childbirth - which, by the
way, women do need - the disability benefits that employers paid to other
workers who needed time off would have to be paid to women as well.
Failing to do so, said the EEOC, was a form of sex discrimination.
The development of law is actually a dance between the three actors that
create law: a legislature, an agency and the courts. After a legislature en-
acts a law, an agency charged with implementing the law sets forth its un-
derstanding of the words of a law. A court will then consider whether it
agrees with the agency's interpretation in the context of a specific case that
comes before the court. And then, full circle, the legislature can decide if it
agrees with the court.
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In the case of the EEOC's interpretation that pregnancy discrimination
was a form of sex discrimination, the Supreme Court, in its wisdom, con-
cluded that it was not sex discrimination. The Court explained that there
are many women who do not get pregnant. Therefore, if an employer dis-
criminates against pregnant women, it is simply discriminating between
men and women who are not pregnant and women who are pregnant. So it
is not sex discrimination because there are many women workers who are
not being discriminated against.
In this dance that creates law, Congress can always respond to a court's
interpretation of the law with which it disagrees. It can't do that when the
Supreme Court construes the federal Constitution, because in that arena, the
Supreme Court is the last word. But when the Supreme Court interprets a
federal statute, Congress can always respond and correct that interpretation.
As you all know, Congress can be a very slow institution. But it did
manage to pass the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (the "PDA") to
overturn the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII. That PDA had
two provisions. First, it said that sex includes pregnancy and childbirth and
its related medical conditions. Second, it said that an employer must treat a
pregnant worker who is unable to work the same as the employer treats oth-
er employees who are similar in their ability or inability to work. This sec-
ond sentence directly addressed the problem of employers providing disa-
bility benefits for workers who had to leave a job for a period of time, while
not providing the same benefits to women who had to leave the job for a pe-
riod of time following childbirth.
I've described a number of interpretations of the sex discrimination pro-
vision of Title VII in which the Commission put forth very positive and
progressive views of what that provision prohibited. But not all the Com-
mission's decisions interpreting the sex discrimination provision were posi-
tive. For example, a few years after Title VII was passed, transgender em-
ployees brought charges saying they had been discriminated against for
transitioning from one sex to another and that was a form of sex discrimina-
tion. And gay employees brought charges saying they had been discrimi-
nated against because of the sex of the person they were attracted to and
that was a form of sex discrimination.
The EEOC just blew those claims away. In various Commission deci-
sions, the agency concluded that these were not forms of sex discrimination.
The Commission did not really explain why these were not forms of sex
discrimination, other than to say that Congress did not intend to cover these
types of situations when it passed Title VII.
20151
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The EEOC was, however, a leader in arguing that sex stereotyping was a
form of sex discrimination. That is, the Commission concluded that if an
employer acted on an assumption about how men and women would act in
a job, or should act in a job, in order to justify hiring men for certain jobs
and women for others -- that was not legitimate under Title VII.
Again, it took a while for employers to accept these restrictions in terms
of the policies they put into place. And it took a while for social norms to
change so that ordinary people began to accept that such assumptions were,
in fact, assumptions and not legitimate grounds for restricting men and
women to different jobs. And finally, the Supreme Court, in a 1989 case
called Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, agreed that acting on the basis of a
gender stereotype was a form of sex discrimination.
In that case, Ann Hopkins had applied to be a partner in Price Water-
house. The decision on whether to admit her to partnership was deferred
for one year, and then the following year, she was denied partnership. This
was at a time where there were very few female partners at the Price Water-
house accounting firm. According to the evidence that came out in the
case, it appeared that several of the other partners in the firm viewed Hop-
kins as too macho and too aggressive. In fact, she was told by one of the
partners - after her partnership decision was deferred for the year -- that she
should act in a more feminine manner (wear more makeup, etc.) in order to
increase her chances of becoming a partner when the decision came up
again.
The Supreme Court ruled that it is a form of sex discrimination for an
employer to make employment decisions on the basis of a gender stereotype
about how women should act. As the Court explained, acting on the basis
of a gender stereotype meant that an employer was inappropriately taking
sex into account in its employment decision. So unless being male or fe-
male fit into a very narrow exception of a "bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion" for a particular job, gender had to be irrelevant to employment deci-
sions -- just as race, national original and religion had to be irrelevant in
employment decisions.
This pronouncement by the Court - that gender must be treated just like
any other prohibited characteristic in the law - might seem like a simple
application of the words of the statute. But it was actually a momentous
statement on the part of the Supreme Court. And that is because, for two
decades, the courts had been twisting themselves into pretzels in order not
to apply the plain words of the statute in a simple, straight-forward fashion.
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THE SEX DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITION IN TITLE VII OF THE CIvIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964 - WHERE ARE WE Now
So where are we now? Is it all over? Have sex and gender become irrel-
evant in the workplaces across our country?
Newsflash -- NOT!
In fact, it is somewhat mind blowing how much it is not over. We are
not yet where we need to be in terms of gender equity. I want to highlight a
few areas where we are not where we should be and offer some ideas for
moving forward to achieve full gender equality in the workplace.
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
I have been amazed, since becoming a Commissioner of the EEOC, how
much sexual harassment is still prevalent in workplaces across the country.
I think, as professional women, we assume there are still some cases of sex-
ual harassment in the workplace, but we don't view sexual harassment as an
epidemic in the workplace. At least, I did not view it in that way before I
joined the Commission.
But since I have been a Commissioner, and I see the countless stories
that cross my desk, I feel there is an epidemic of sexual harassment in some
specific areas in our workplaces. These areas include women in low wage
jobs, teenagers who are working in their first jobs (often in food service or
retail), immigrant women, and women who are working in non-traditional,
male-dominated jobs where there are very few other women in that work-
place.
Going back to the framework with which I started my remarks, law can
serve as one critical variable in stopping this sexual harassment. It often
forces top management to take notice if harassment is occurring in their
workplaces and to try to put policies in place to stop that.
But law on its own will never be enough to stop harassment in the work-
place. Instead, we need a multi-prong strategy that will include changing
social norms in order for harassment in the workplace to stop. This strategy
requires government to work in partnership with advocacy groups, employ-
ers, and women and men on the ground in the workplace. I think using so-
cial media can also be a really useful and important tool in this effort. I
happen to be a Twitter fiend. You can follow me @chaifeldblum where I
tweet on civil rights and social justice issues. I spend time posting on Twit-
ter, Facebook, and Tumblr -- and I appreciate others who spend time on
20151
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those platforms as well, talking about civil rights issues - because I believe
that using social media can be an important tool for changing social norms.
PREGNANCY ACCOMMODATIONS
The second area I want to talk about is that of accommodations for preg-
nant workers on the job.
We still deal today with many blatant cases of pregnancy discrimination
in which an employer fires a worker because she is pregnant (and tells her
that is the reason) or does not hire an applicant who is pregnant (and again
tells her that is the reason!). But there is also a pervasive discriminatory
policy that occurs in many workplaces that many employers do not perceive
as discriminatory. Many employers have written policies that give male or
female employees who have been injured on the job, or who have a disabil-
ity under the ADA, reasonable accommodations that will enable those em-
ployees to stay employed while they have some physical restrictions. These
accommodations can include modified job duties or light duty if, for exam-
ple, an employee has lifting restrictions. But these written policies also ex-
plicitly state that similar accommodations will not be given to pregnant
workers who have similar physical limitations.
Employers maintain these policies despite the plain language of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act that says that pregnant workers must be
treated the same as other workers who are similar in their ability or inability
to work. This is an issue I have personally been working on steadily for
over two years at the Commission. For that reason, I was very pleased that,
two months ago in June, the EEOC finally issued guidance interpreting the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act as requiring equal accommodations for
pregnant workers in such situations.
By the way, the guidance we issued was contrary to interpretations of the
PDA that had been issued by four Circuit Courts of Appeals previous to our
guidance. I remember that when I first read those appellate cases, they
seemed flatly wrong to me in terms of basic rules of statutory interpretation.
(I guess that's what happens when a law professor who has taught Legisla-
tion for over a decade becomes a Commissioner at the EEOC.) Because of
that, for over two years inside the agency, I pushed for the Commission to
issue guidance explaining our view of the PDA's requirements with regard
to accommodations for pregnant workers - much as the EEOC had put forth
its views of the sex discrimination provision in the early years through
guidance that it issued.
Next term the Supreme Court will decide a case raising this precise issue,
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Young v. UPS. So we will see if the Court agrees with the EEOC that the
circuit courts below were wrong.1
PAY EQUITY
The third issue I want to address is pay equity for women. This is obvi-
ously a huge issue and I am not going to go into extensive details in these
remarks. But I do want to highlight a few key points.
Some of the pay disparity that exists today between men and women de-
rives from straightforward discrimination against women. We need to fight
1 Addendum: On March 25, 2015, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Young v. UPS that rejected the approach of the four circuit courts of appeals and
affirmed the result that the EEOC's approach was seeking. Young v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., No. 12-1226, 2015 WL 1310745 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2015). The Court disa-
greed with the Commission's legal theory that it was a case of direct discrimination
when an employer's policy did not provide accommodations to pregnant workers if
the employers provided accommodations to other workers. The Court thought that
approach went too far, because it might be applied to mean that all pregnant work-
ers would get accommodations even if only a few other workers got accommoda-
tions for some very specific reasons. However, the Court did agree with the
EEOC's approach that a case of indirect discrimination could be successfully
proved under the McDonnell-Douglas framework of indirect discrimination.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In the EEOC's guid-
ance, we had also disagreed with the four circuit courts in their application of the
McDonnell-Douglas framework. Id. We stated that a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation could be proven by a pregnant worker by showing that other classes of em-
ployees - such as those injured on the job or who had disabilities under the ADA -
received accommodations while pregnant workers did not. The circuit courts had
concluded that a prima facie case could not be made out in such circumstances be-
cause those other classes were not "similar to" the pregnant workers. In Young v.
UPS, the Court agreed with the EEOC's view of how to apply the McDonnell-
Douglas framework and moreover, provided additional and useful guidelines for
how to apply that framework. See Young, No. 12-1226, 2015 WL 1310745, at
*15-17. I look forward to the EEOC issuing a revised guidance that follows the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the PDA. As a practical matter, either theory of
the PDA results in pregnant workers getting the accommodations they need once
employers provide such accommodations to other classes of workers. The day that
the Young case was issued was a good day for gender equity in the workplace.
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that discrimination through an aggressive use of the first variable of social
change - law. Both the EOOC and private plaintiff lawyers need to contin-
ue bringing litigation to fight these cases of discrimination and to stop this
pay inequity.
But a fair amount of the pay disparity that exists today between men and
women is due to the significant gender job segregation that still exists. The
research shows that female-dominated occupations pay less than male-
dominated occupations at the same skill levels. That is, if a man and a
woman have similar education and level of skills, but the woman enters a
female-dominated job (such as being a waitress or a nurse) and the man en-
ters a male-dominated occupation (such as being a welder or a plumber),
the male-dominated occupation will pay more.
You may be surprised by the extent of gender job segregation that still
exists. I certainly was. As lawyers, I think we do not personally see exten-
sive gender job segregation because there is significant gender integration
in professional occupations such as law, medicine and accounting. But if
we look at our country's workplaces overall, there is a stunning amount of
gender job segregation. According to research conducted by the Institute
for Women's Policy Research (1WPR), almost 40% of women in this coun-
try work in female-dominated occupations. That is, they work in jobs in
which at least 75% of the workers in that occupation are female. And
slightly more than 40% of men in this country work in male-dominated oc-
cupations - that is, in jobs where there is only 5% of women in those occu-
pations. Obviously, given the reality that male-dominated occupations pay
more than female-dominated occupations, this significant gender job segre-
gation will skew the overall wages that are paid to men and women in this
country.
Changing this type of occupational segregation requires an overall, mul-
ti-pronged, strategic campaign. Law is a critical component of this strategy.
EEOC and private plaintiff lawyers need to continue bringing litigation
against employers that are denying jobs to female applicants who seek entry
to male-dominated occupations, simply because those applicants are wom-
en. But litigation will never be sufficient. This strategic campaign must be
multi-faceted. It has to include making sure that the American Job Centers
funded by the federal government are not steering women into waitressing
jobs and men into welding jobs -- and then getting credit simply for finding
each person a job, even if the job is in a gender segregated occupation. And
it requires changing social norms so that women in male-dominated occu-
pations are not harassed and effectively chased out of those jobs. And, the
most difficult change in social norms, we need to get to a place where
14
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 18 [2014], Iss. 4, Art. 3
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol18/iss4/3
GENDER EQUITY IN THE 2 1 sT CENTURY
women and men feel that all occupations are equally open to them and
should be considered equally realistic occupations.
These are just a few issues that we are working on at the EEOC today.
Thinking of making change in these areas is what gives me the passion to
wake up every day and go into the office - or, as is often the case, to wake
up in the morning and go to my computer and telecommute to the office --
because of all the work we can thankfully now do via email and phone
calls.
I want to end with a final issue that I think has more unqualified good
news than the three areas I have just described. Don't get me wrong -- I be-
lieve we will achieve the necessary changes in those three areas as well as
many others. But achieving those changes will take both significant time
and effective multi-pronged strategies.
COVERAGE OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER PEOPLE
UNDER TITLE VII
Achieving full protection for LGBT people under existing sex discrimi-
nation law will also take time, as courts begin to grapple with the legal the-
ories I am about to discuss. But I don't think achieving this goal will re-
quire the same type of multi-pronged strategies that I described above. That
is because a fair amount of the movement needed in the two other variables
for social change -- policies in practice and social norms -- has already oc-
curred. Indeed, it is precisely because of such change that the first variable
- that of law - is now being applied in a different way.
As you heard, I was one of the main drafters of the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act (ENDA) that was first introduced in 1994. The students
in the room may be interested to know that the first draft of ENDA was
based on a law school exam. In 1992, I wrote a law school exam for my
statutory interpretation class in which I created a bill for the students inter-
pret. The bill prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in
employment and other areas. I patterned that bill on the Americans with
Disabilities Act, which was also on my computer since I had been active in
drafting that bill as well. Obviously, I put in a few statutory drafting mud-
dles in the bill, so I would have a basis for asking some tough questions in
the exam. I then got hired as a consultant to a gay rights group to help work
on creating a bill that would prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in a
range of areas, including employment. I had only two days' notice before
the first meeting I would be attending of the drafting group. I did not know
if the group had already come up with a proposed draft of a bill. But I
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knew that words are important. So I figured I would come with a draft of
my own. I pulled up the exam, fixed the mistakes, and that became the first
draft of the bill. That first draft covered not just employment, but also pub-
lic accommodation and state and local services. But after the debacle of the
gays in the military effort in 1993, which I was also involved in, we decided
to cut the bill down to employment only because that is where the polls
showed the strongest support. And, as you know, Congress has yet to pass
ENDA, despite the fact that it has been introduced in every consecutive
Congress since 1994.
But, as I like to say: "A funny thing happened on the way to non-
passage" of ENDA. The gender stereotyping prohibition of the existing
law, Title VII, began to be applied in a different way to LGBT people who
were experiencing discrimination. This new way of applying Title VII
arose, I think, because of changes in social norms. That is, the societal
changes of the last few decades enabled agencies and courts to logically ap-
ply the gender stereotyping prohibition of Title VII in a way that it should
have always been applied to LGBT people.
Transgender people who experienced discrimination based on their gen-
der identity were the first to get traction under the gender stereotyping pro-
tection of Title VII. Perhaps this was because it was easy for courts to un-
derstand that employers were acting on the basis of a gender stereotype --
that is, the gender assumption that women should not transition to being
men and men should not transition to being women - when employers dis-
criminated against someone for being transgender. So a number of courts
began to extend protection for transgender people under Title VII based on
a theory of prohibited gender stereotyping.
I am proud that the EEOC, in April 2012, issued a decision called Macy
v. DOJ in which the agency reversed its previous rulings to the contrary and
took the position that discrimination on the basis of gender identity is al-
ways a form of sex discrimination. We made that determination both on the
gender stereotyping theory, as well as on a simple straightforward reading
of the plain text of the law. Under that latter analysis, if an employer was
ready to hire an applicant when the applicant was male, but was not ready
to hire that same person if she planned to start work as a female - then that
employer was clearly "taking sex into account." And that is precisely what
the plain words of Title VII prohibit.
And so the word has gone out to our investigators in all fifty-three EEOC
offices around the country. They now know that if a person comes in
claiming to have been discriminated against because he or she is
transgender, our investigators know to accept that as a sex discrimination
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charge and to code that charge in our computer system as a charge of sex
discrimination/gender identity. There is actually now a separate code in our
computer system for gender identity charges, so we can track how many of
these charges we are receiving.
And, starting in 2011, and continuing until now, the EEOC has also ruled
that LGB employees and applicants can use the sex discrimination prohibi-
tion of Title VII to challenge discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The agency has done this based on a robust application of the gender stereo-
typing theory. That is, we have explained that if an employer discriminates
against an individual because that individual does not conform to the most
basic of gender stereotypes - the assumption that men and women should
be sexually attracted to people of the opposite sex (including marrying peo-
ple of the opposite sex) - that employer has engaged in a form of impermis-
sible sex discrimination by acting on the basis of that gender stereotype.
So the word has gone out to our investigators in our fifty-three EEOC of-
fices across the country that if a gay man, lesbian, or bisexual person comes
in claiming discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, they are to ac-
cept that as a sex discrimination charge and code that charge in our system
as a sex/sexual orientation charge.
It is amazing to me what codes can do. After the codes were put into in
our computer system, whenever I felt depressed about some issue or anoth-
er at work, I would say, "but there are now codes for sexual orientation and
gender identity in our system. Wow."
As I noted earlier, there is always an ongoing dance between the various
actors responsible for the creation and interpretation of law -- the legisla-
ture, the agency and the courts. I expect to see that dance continue, in terms
of whether the EEOC's interpretation of sex discrimination will be adopted
by the courts. There was a D.C. district court decision in March 2014, Tev-
eer v. Library of Congress, that adopted the robust gender stereotyping the-
ory that the EEOC has been using. In that case, the plaintiff was an indi-
vidual who did not meet the appearance stereotype of being a gay man, in
the sense of being too effeminate in his dress or gestures. A number of
courts over the years had protected lesbians who were harassed because
they were "too macho" or gay men who were harassed because they were
"too femme." But the DC federal district court in 2014 adopted the more
robust gender stereotyping theory that the EEOC has adopted in many of its
rulings - that if an employer takes an adverse employment action against
someone because that person does not meet the stereotype that a man or a
woman should be sexually attracted to someone of the opposite sex - that is
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a form of sex discrimination. So, I look forward to seeing what other courts
will decide, as they get this issue before them.
CONCLUSION
Let me conclude with this thought. Fifty years ago, Congress passed Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and set us off on a journey in which
sex would not be taken into account in the workplace, just as race, color,
national origin and religion would not be taken into account in the work-
place. The journey has not been a simple one, and it is not over yet. But
over time, the law has been understood and interpreted to cover many forms
of discrimination that the 1964 Congress could not have even anticipated.
The law has generated policies and practice that have helped advance gen-
der equity, as well as equity on the basis of race, color, national origin, and
religion. And the law has both shaped social norms and been shaped by
changing social norms in return. We all need to remain part of this great
journey, and to do our bit in bringing about complete equity in our work-
places.
Thank you so much for your attention, and for your engagement in this
important journey. Thank you so much. [Applause].
I'm happy to take questions, not only on the gender equity issues that I
have been talking about, but on any other issue. The EEOC has been ac-
tively working on so many other issues as well - for example, the guidance
we issued regarding how an employer may and may not use criminal back-
ground checks if they have a disparate impact based on race. So I am happy
to take questions on a range of subjects.
QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION:
Question: Well, my actual question is, I understand, from what I have
learned about the Civil Rights movement, litigation in the whole law pro-
cess was a huge part in changing general sentiment. But, I figure, from my
own experience, the law process is pretty long, and drawn out, and expen-
sive. How are people able to fund this large-scale litigation, getting into
high court, and getting these cases on a big stage, if they were not really in
support of it? If the general consensus was a certain belief, how do they get
it to be at a high court level, and actually be viable in a court case?
Answer: Well, as you heard from the first panel, some of this was done
on the sweat and equity of individual people. I think it is going to be great
that we will be able to hear, after lunch, reflections from Senator Marsh on
18
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 18 [2014], Iss. 4, Art. 3
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol18/iss4/3
GENDER EQUITY IN THE 2 1 sT CENTURY
this. But, to me, that is why we need a partnership between advocacy
groups and the government. This is the point about democracy -- that we
can associate with each other and create advocacy groups that will not only
fund litigation, but also push for legislation. As I hope I've explained in
this talk, change often has to start with the legislation, before you even get
to the courts. Unless you are bringing litigation under the federal Constitu-
tion, you first have to pass the law.
You have to affect Congress in order to pass the law, you have to affect
the agencies who are implementing the law so that they implement it effec-
tively, and then you also have to bring litigation. And that requires individ-
ual people standing up for their rights; it means individual people bringing
charges to the EEOC. It means having groups that will support these indi-
vidual people.
That is why, to me, this needs to be a real synergistic effort between ad-
vocacy groups, individuals, and government agencies. It has taken a long
time to get to where we are on race equality, and we're still not where we
need to be. So, yes, there's been money and support, and sweat and blood
and tears of individuals, but there is still more to do.
Question: What role do you think the activist organizations like CORE
(Congress on Race Equality), SNCC (Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee) and others had on the Supreme Court and the EEOC in bring-
ing about more justice?
Answer: I think the impact of those groups were huge, just huge. Some
of the groups were active in terms of getting the law passed in the first
place. So that was huge in terms of being involved in the legislation itself.
And then that carried over to the EEOC. The five EEOC Commissioners --
there are always five commissioners, and no more than three of us can be of
the same political party, so there is always built-in bipartisanship in the
Commission - these five Commissioners knew they were on the hot seat in
terms of race discrimination because there were people on the outside who
were watching them and pushing them. This is what the women's advo-
cates realized that they needed to have as well. No matter how good the
people who go into government are, they need people on the outside to be
pushing them. (By the way, I have now been in government for four years
and, let me tell you, it is like a different country. I feel I should have gotten
a passport and a dictionary before I entered the federal government.) But
anyway, no matter how good and well-meaning you are, you need the pres-
sure from outside to move anything. You are not going to do it on your
own. So, my answer is: groups like that are hugely important.
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Question: More specifically, was the fear of riots and disturbances in the
north a motivating factor in the passage of the act, and in the way the act
was enforced?
Answer: This is not my area of expertise and I am glad I was here this
morning and could listen to the first panel. Because based on those presen-
tations, I think we can say quite unequivocally: yes. I am going to be inter-
ested in going back and looking at some of the history in the EEOC to see if
there were references to that in some way. I imagine that there might be
because again, people do not move unless they feel there is some interest in
moving, some self-interest in moving. And I think the EEOC probably felt
it did not want to be charged with having encouraged these riots because it
was deficient in what it was doing.
Question: Good Morning. I am a disabled veteran who was serving in the
Marine Corp at the time that the National Defense Authorization Act for
fiscal year 2012 was passed in Congress that gave authority to the respec-
tive secretaries to recognize openly gay individuals and did allow them to
get married in the states that authorized it. But because of the federal defi-
nition and the DOMA, the second section that stated that marriage was be-
tween a man and a woman, they did not extend to them the rights given to
heterosexual marriages, basically the increased financial benefits you would
get with housing allowances. Given that Windsor struck that down, do you
foresee changes and how long do you think that would take?
Answer: First, to give some background to others -- the Windsor case
was brought by Edie Windsor. She and her long-time female partner owned
a New York City apartment together and it had significantly appreciated in
value. When Edie's partner died, Edie discovered she had to pay a tax to
the federal government that was in the thousands of dollars, which if she
had been married to a spouse she would not have had to pay. Well, in fact
she was married to her partner. So she argued that her marriage should be
recognized by the federal government and that the section of the Defense of
Marriage Act that says -- regardless of whether a same-sex couple is legally
married in a state, the federal government will not recognize that marriage -
was unconstitutional. And in the Windsor case, a year ago, the Supreme
Court agreed that the challenged section of DOMA was unconstitutional.
Shortly afterward the Office of Personnel Management, which is basical-
ly the big human resources agency for the whole federal government said,
"Okay, if you are a federal employee who got married in a state that recog-
nizes marriage between same-sex couples, we will treat you as married for
purposes of all federal benefits." Several months later, the federal govern-
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ment also decided that even if you lived in a state that did not recognize
marriage between same-sex couples, but you had gone to another state that
did recognize marriages between same sex couples and had gotten married
in that state - then again, the federal government would treat you as married
for purposes of federal benefits. That was huge.
But how far the federal government could go with this rule also depend-
ed on the particular statute that provided the benefits. So they were able to
apply that rule to basically everything, except I think, for Social Security
benefits, because of the way the Social Security Act is written. So, I do not
know in terms of the question you are asking. It sounds from what you are
saying the VA has not applying this rule? I thought there was another
agency besides SSA that had a problem with the statute and perhaps it was
the VA. But I don't know that so I would want to go back and check. But
if that is the problem, what would be necessary is a change made by Con-
gress with regard to the Social Security law or the VA law and then we are
back to the problem that Congress does not move quickly.
Question: I am right now taking a class, called Sex, Mindfulness and the
Law, and it is all about Title IX. You resonate something that I said on my
first day of class, is this issue is so complex, and the law alone will not
solve it. We need the cultural input in it. Despite that fact, after the prom-
ulgation of the 'Dear Colleague' letter, in 2011, disciplinary action against
the sex offenders has been taken from the judiciary, to private institutions
and the standard has been lowered from, 'beyond reasonable doubt' to
something really close to 'preponderance of the evidence'. I'm just a little
bit worried that, a 19 or 18 year old, student who is also privileged, proba-
bly, in a private institution, is afforded less constitutional protection than a
sex offender, who is violent, and who has the 'beyond a reasonable doubt'
standard that could protect him. Now, each school has its own standards,
each school has its tribunals. And, you mention that it is always a dance be-
tween the EEOC, the judiciary, and the legislature, and now we get these
private institutions doing all what courts generally do, because in many ar-
ticles, people say that the judiciary actually failed to solve this problem. Do
you believe that such, I would not call it defects, but concerns in Title IX
would hinder the movement to solve the sexual harassment cultures within
campuses?
Answer: There are various pieces in your question, so let me unpack it a
bit. First, again, as background for the audience about Title IX that you ref-
erenced. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 says that any edu-
cational institution that receives federal financial assistance may not dis-
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criminate on the basis of sex. Part of why that law was necessary was that
when the Civil Rights Act of 1964 passed, as you heard this morning, Title
VI of that statute was very important because it said that any recipient of
federal financial assistance could not discriminate based on race, color or
religion. But Title VI did not include sex. So in 1972, there was the effort
to include the sex discrimination prohibition at least for educational institu-
tions that were receiving federal financial assistance.
Then, in this dance of law that happens, the Supreme Court narrowed the
law. In a sex discrimination case brought against a university, the Court
ruled that the only entity within the university that was bound by the sex
discrimination provision was the entity that actually received the federal fi-
nancial assistance. And for private schools, what do you think is the federal
financial assistance that they get? The students in this room should know it.
Student loans. Student loans were how the federal government interacted
with private schools in terms of providing funds. And so the Supreme
Court ruled that the financial aid office of a college could not discriminate
based on sex, but the rest of the college could.
So, in this dance of law, Congress then passed the Civil Rights Restora-
tion Act of 1987 to say - no, if a university gets federal funds through the
student loans, then the entire entity is covered. By the way, this was when I
first entered the Washington political world. The Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987 amended not only Title IX of the Education Amendments, but
also three other laws that covered recipients of federal funds, including Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act that prohibited discrimination based on
disability. I was working at the time for the ACLU's AIDS project, and
some people in Congress wanted to use the Civil Rights Restoration Act to
exclude people with AIDS and HIV infection from the protection of Section
504.
With that background, let me get to the question you raised - which, by
the way, is not directly in my area of expertise, so maybe that's why I pro-
vided so much background! But I will just say what I can about your ques-
tion. There is a huge concern with what is called "the school to prison pipe-
line." This pipeline disproportionately affects young kids who are of color
and young kids with disabilities. When these kids misbehave, it used to be
that in order for those kids to have a criminal record, they had to be adjudi-
cated in a court. But what has happened is that more adjudications have
been taken into the school system itself under its disciplinary system and it
turns out that these systems disproportionately discipline kids of color and
kids with disabilities. Ultimately many of these kids end up in prison, cre-
ating this "pipeline" of school to prison.
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How do we break this? Again, let me note that this is not in the jurisdic-
tion of the EEOC, since we cover only employment. This issue is in the ju-
risdiction of the Department of Education. But through the efforts there of
people who care about race and disability, the Department of Education is-
sued guidance recently to govern some of the activities on the part of
schools that engage in these disciplinary systems.
Personally, I am not sure that any guidance will be enough. This prob-
lem definitely requires a multi-pronged strategy and it poses a really tough
challenge. We have to deal with the basic social conditions in this country
that affect race in such a disproportionate way. This is not an easy issue.
Those of us who are social progressives have been trying for years to ad-
dress these issues. In fact, right after lunch, you are going to be hearing
from a person who has been at this for decades.
But I do not want to end on a pessimistic note. So let me just say - thank
goodness, that there are people who understand that these are problems in
our country. The fact that there are people across this country who worry
about social justice issues is a good thing. Our job now is to join forces and
try to make an impact. That is certainly my goal in life and I am thrilled to
be talking to an audience that I know has either already engaged in these
same efforts or who are preparing themselves now to be the next generation
of leaders. I am really happy to have the next generation address some of
these challenges, because you all will be the ones coming up with new ideas




Feldblum: Gender Equity in the 21st Century: Keynote Address
Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2014
440 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XVIII:iv
24
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 18 [2014], Iss. 4, Art. 3
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol18/iss4/3
